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Miller: Promised Reforms Fall Short of the Mark

PROMISED REFORMS FALL SHORT OF THE MARK
Colleen Miller*
Did the General Assembly pass sweeping mental health law reforms?
Do the new laws make it easier to hospitalize individuals against their will,
and if so, is that a desirable end? While new legislation rewords our civil
commitment statute,1 do the new words really improve Virginia's mental
health care system? In all likelihood, the most significant effect of the new
legislation will be making our mental health laws more vulnerable to
constitutional challenge, while simultaneously making it more difficult for
Virginians to get necessary mental health treatment voluntarily.
Civil commitment statutes establish standards that must be met before a
2
state can force an individual into a hospital for treatment against his will.
Before the 2008 session, Virginia law permitted the Commonwealth to
deprive an individual of his liberty rights and force him into a mental
hospital for having a mental illness, where he either (1) presented an
"imminent danger" to himself or others, or (2) was "substantially unable to
care for himself," and needed treatment but was not willing to accept it
voluntarily. 3 This standard closely tracked the criteria established by the
4
Supreme Court of the United States in O'Connor v. Donaldson.
Even prior to the incident on April 16, 2007 when a suspected mentally
ill student killed himself and thirty-two others at Virginia Tech, 5 academics
and others believed that Virginia's civil commitment standards needed to be
changed. 6 For more than thirty years, Virginia law allowed jurists to define
* J.D., 1984, cum laude, University of Pittsburgh; B.S., 1981, magna cum laude, Dickinson College.
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state agency that advocates the rights of people with disabilities. Prior to coming to Virginia, she was
the legal director for the New Mexico Protection and Advocacy System, and before that was the Senior
Trial Attorney for the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice.
1. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
3. Id.
4. 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975).
5. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in U.S.
History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
6. ELIZABETH MCGARVEY, COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, CIVIL COMMITMENT
PRACTICES IN VIRGINIA: PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-3 (2007), available at
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the spectrum of dangerousness or inability for personal care and an
individual's placement on that spectrum. 7 This determination guided the
decision as to whether the state could deprive the individual of liberty and
force him into an institution. 8 As a practical matter, whether an individual
was committed or released often depended as much on the personal beliefs
of the presiding jurist as it did on the circumstances of the individual before
the court.
The Virginia Tech Review Panel and the Supreme Court of Virginia's
Mental Health Law Reform Commission studied these issues extensively
and provided their findings and recommendations to the General Assembly
this winter. 9 But the legislature chose not to follow the study groups'
recommended changes to the civil commitment standard. Instead, the
General Assembly chose to consider new provisions. 10 The result does
little to resolve confusion, presents interesting evidentiary problems, and
may leave our commitment law more vulnerable to constitutional challenge
than before.
Under the new law, passed by both the Senate and the House of
Delegates and signed by the Governor, a person with mental illness can be
forced into a hospital if:
there is a substantial likelihood that, as a result of mental illness, the person
will, in the near future, (1) cause serious physical harm to himself or others as
evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm and
other relevant information, if any, or (2) suffer serious harm due to his lack of
capacity to protect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human needs,
and (b) all available less restrictive treatment alternatives to involuntary
inpatient treatment... that would offer an opportunity for the improvement of
the person's condition have been investigated and determined to be
inappropriate. 11

Although the core conditions of dangerousness or lack of personal care
abilities remain the standard, noticeable changes in the wording exist. For
example, the old law's "danger" to self or others standard has been replaced
by "likelihood of serious harm" to self or others. 12 Similarly, the new law
http://www.courts.state.va.us/cmh/civil commitmentpractices focusgroups.pdf; VA. TECH REVIEW
PANEL,

MASS SHOOTINGS

AT VIRGINIA TECH:

REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL

1-2 (2007),

http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/report/07 SUMMARY.pdf.
7. See VA. CODE ANN. §37.2 -817.
8. See id.
9. MCGARVEY, supra note 6, at 1, 56; VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supranote 6, at 1.
10. See H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.

2008).
11. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
12. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2005), with H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
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replaces the old-and much simpler--"imminent" danger requirement with
a finding that harm is "substantial[ly] likel[y]" to occur "in the near
future." 13

It remains to be seen whether this substitution of nearly synonymous
words will achieve the law's desired effect on judgments made by
magistrates and special justices when deciding whether to take away an
individual's rights. But if these changes are interpreted to enable the
Commonwealth to operate under a lesser standard than the Constitution
permits, Virginia has set itself up for unnecessary legal challenges.
Some of the most interesting-and potentially threatening-issues raised
by the new law are ones affecting the standard of proof and the
admissibility of evidence in commitment proceedings. For example, in
considering whether a substantial likelihood exists that an individual will
cause serious physical harm to himself or others, any relevant information
can be considered; however, there must also be evidence of "recent
behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm.... ' 14 It would appear to
follow, therefore, that if evidence of these behaviors is not before the court,
no other evidence may be considered, regardless of its nature.
This strict rule results from the legislature's use of the word "and" in the
place of "or" in the new legislation, which does not appear to be an
16
accident.15 The legislature specifically considered a proposal to use "or,"
but wisely decided against it. Using the conjunction "or" essentially would
have removed all limits on what could be considered when deciding
whether to take away an individual's liberty rights. By choosing the
conjunction "and," legislators decided that other relevant evidence may be
considered only if evidence of recent dangerous behaviors exists first.
While the new law sets a strict limit on what is to be decided, it
establishes extremely lax standards on how to make the decision. The new
standard strictly insists on proof of recent behaviors. 17 But in proving those
behaviors for the purpose of obtaining an emergency custody order, jurists
can now accept "any other information available that the magistrate

13. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §37.2 -817(B), with H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008);
S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
14. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
15. See H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2008).
16. Legislative Information Services, Bill Tracking: HB499, 2008 Session, http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=081&typ=bil&val=hb499 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008); Legislative Information
Services,
Bill
Tracking:
SB246,
2008
Session,
http://legl.state.va.us/cgibin/legp504.exe?ses=08l&typ=bil&val=sb246 (last visited Apr. 17,2008).
17. See supratext accompanying notes 11-13.
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considers relevant," 18 including hearsay and other evidence that would not
be considered reliable enough for admissibility in criminal or other legal
proceedings.
Perhaps most worrisome of all is the new provision allowing magistrates
to consider testimony in the form of affidavits "if the witness is unavailable
and it so states in the affidavit." 19 This troubling exception to wellestablished rules of evidence purports to summarily deprive the individual
20
of his constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses against him.
The second of the core conditions deals with circumstances when
individuals may be deprived of their liberty rights because they are unable
to care for themselves. 21 This highly paternalistic standard has always been
problematic, for it is a matter of opinion as to whether the court should
consider lifestyle matters as mundane as personal hygiene or the cleanliness
of one's home. The standard under the old law was that a person must be
"substantially" unable to care for himself.22 The new language essentially
permits commitment if there is a substantial likelihood that an individual
with a mental illness will cause serious harm to himself or others or suffer
serious harm due to a lack of capacity or ability to provide for his basic
23
human needs.
The words chosen may be significant because legislators had the choice
of triggering commitments when there was simply diminished capacity.
Instead, they chose to limit forced hospitalization to those who lack
24
capacity altogether.
Significantly, the legislature did little to help people avoid the need for
hospitalization or maintain mental health upon release from institutions.
Federal laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, 25 make clear that
people with disabilities, including people with mental illnesses, have the

18. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
19. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

21. See supra note 2.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2 -817(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005).

23. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
24. The use of the term "lack of capacity" in the involuntary commitment standard will circumscribe the
option of forcing outpatient treatment on an individual, as well. Under the new legislation, a person
cannot be ordered into outpatient treatment unless he has the capacity to comply with the treatment plan.
H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 315, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008). An
individual who lacks the capacity to protect himself would not have the capacity to comply with an
outpatient treatment plan. Forced outpatient treatment, therefore, will be an option only for those who
meet the dangerousness conditions. See H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
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26
right to receive services in the setting that restricts their liberty the least.
Apparently ignoring the federal mandate, Virginia's legislature passed laws
designed to encourage greater use of the most restrictive setting possible:
27
forced hospitalization.

If our legislature were serious about vigorously addressing the problems
of mental illness, it easily could have taken some significant steps to help
people with mental illness avoid the need for hospitalization in the first
place. For example, the legislature could have approved appropriate
funding to increase the availability of mental health services in the
community.
Or it could have added enough flexibility to the
Commonwealth's "auxiliary grant" program to allow people to use it
effectively to secure appropriate living arrangements upon release from
28
institutions.
Unfortunately, the legislature did not adopt these or other positive
measures to address the problems of mental illness in Virginia. Instead,
Virginia will now channel resources into the process for involuntary civil
commitment, thereby using funds that could have been available for better
voluntary services. The legislature elected to gut the funding of many of
the community-based programs proposed this year, to spend another year
studying the auxiliary grant program, and to concentrate on rewording the
commitment statute.
The United States Constitution guarantees individual liberty under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 29 and courts have long understood that a
state can only deprive an individual of liberty because of mental illness
under very limited circumstances. 30 Virginia's "reform" efforts may well
exceed the boundaries of those and other constitutional protections. It
remains to be seen whether the changes to Virginia's commitment laws are
merely word games or something much more ominous.

26. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2007).
27. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
28. The auxiliary grant program provides supplemental assistance to people who need some kind of
supported living arrangements, but as it is currently structured, the grants can only be used in
institutional settings called "assisted living facilities." VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-800 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 508-11 (1972); Evans v. Paderick, 443 F. Supp. 583,
585 (E.D. Va. 1977).
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